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Abstract
Sweden and Spain experiment with different provider models to reform healthcare provision. Both models have 
in common that they extend the role of the for-profit sector in healthcare. As the analysis of Saltman and Duran 
demonstrates, privatisation is an ambiguous and contested strategy that is used for quite different purposes. In 
our comment, we emphasize that their analysis leaves questions open on the consequences of privatisation for the 
performance of healthcare and the role of the public sector in healthcare provision. Furthermore, we briefly address 
the absence of the option of healthcare provision by not-for-profit providers in the privatisation strategy of Sweden 
and Spain.
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Introduction
Privatization is an ambiguous instrument in the health 
policy-makers’ toolbox ranging from the outsourcing of 
operational activities (eg, laundry, security) and joint ventures 
to the conversion of public hospitals into private ones or the 
penetration of for-profit providers into an otherwise public 
healthcare provision system. It is also a contested instrument 
that almost everywhere provokes a merely ideological debate 
between proponents and adversaries. In several countries 
privatisation is introduced (or considered) as an effective 
antidote to widespread problems in public provider systems 
such as weak capital investment routines, poor reward 
structures and work rule arrangements, lack of patient 
responsiveness client and politically motivated short-term 
interference. Saltman and Duran1 discuss two countries, 
Sweden and Spain, respectively, where privatisation is 
currently experimented with, although in Sweden in a more 
radical way than in Spain. A common characteristic of the 
governance structure in both countries is the prominent role 
of the regional level in healthcare provision; they belong to 
the category of decentralized national health systems and thus 
their probably exists considerable variety in ownership types 
between regions in these countries. 
The main strength of their article lies in their description of 
how the governance of healthcare provision has been changing 
over the past decades into the direction of privatisation. From 
their analysis also follows that privatisation can be shaped 
in many different ways: privatisation in Sweden is quite 
different from privatisation in Spain. Unfortunately, they are 
rather silent on the longer-term consequences of privatisation 
for healthcare provision. Does the private sector indeed 
outperform the public sector in terms of efficiency, quality of 
care (including continuity of care), innovativeness and patient-
responsiveness, as the advocates of privatisation claim? What 
is its impact on healthcare expenditures and, last but not least, 
on the performance of the public sector itself? One probable 
reason for not addressing these important questions is the 
lack of sound empirical analysis in these countries. 
 
Sweden: Privatization of Primary Care
A distinctive characteristic of Sweden’s system for primary 
care services is that doctors are unionized employees of 
the county council. Whereas the system features (very) low 
volumes in terms of visits per patient et cetera, it scores well 
in terms of quality of care, also in comparison to many other 
European countries.2 Nevertheless, there were continuing 
signs of public dissatisfaction on waiting times, the lack of 
convenient opening times and, perhaps most important, 
the difficulty of building a personal relationship with a 
doctor. In order to address these problems, the government 
implemented a reform in 2010 requiring all 21 counties to 
allow private primary care practices to be established, and 
fund those practices on a contract basis, tied to the number 
of patients they saw. The reform built upon earlier initiatives 
of 5 counties. The purpose of the reform was not only to 
increase patient choice but also to foster efficiency and patient 
responsiveness. The reform had a significant impact on 
primary care, especially in the main urban areas. Stockholm 
in many ways has pioneered this trend.3 Within eight months, 
the number of private for-profit centres had increased by 
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more than 20%; and within two years 50% of all primary 
care visits took place in non-public practices. These are, by 
all standards, impressive numbers that must have surprised 
many experts and stakeholders. While the reform seems to 
have increased public satisfaction, its impact on healthcare 
expenditures remains unclear in the analysis of Saltman and 
Duran. In this respect one should keep in mind that greater 
efficiency does not necessarily mean lower total expenditures. 
Perhaps unanticipated, it are many new private for-profit 
firms from outside the regular healthcare sector, including 
risk-capital funds, that operate the majority of these additional 
care providers. The pace of growth seems breath-taking and 
resembles the unanticipated increase of for-profit clinics 
in the United States after the introduction of the Medicare 
program (1966) or the rapid privatization of the public 
hospitals in the German Democratic Republic after 1989.4 
The Swedish experience illustrates the findings of studies that 
hypothesize that for-profit providers seem more responsive 
to (new) external incentives than either public or non-profit 
providers.5 Also notice in this respect that earlier reforms 
to improve the primary care system from within had largely 
failed. 
The Swedish reform raises many pertinent questions on 
privatisation in healthcare. What will be the structural impact 
of the allowance of private for-profit practice in primary care? 
Will it imply the eventual end of the public delivery system 
or will it only add an extra layer to primary care, making 
the provision system more diverse? Who will benefit from 
this development and who will incur its costs? How will the 
penetration of for-profit health centres affect the performance 
of the public centres? Experience in other countries including 
the United States and Germany indicate, that the threat of 
the private sector does enforce the public sector to an extent 
to adapt their strategy in order to survive in a competitive 
environment. Finally, there is a perhaps inconvenient lesson 
for public policy-makers: reforms mobilizing external forces 
to bring about change may have more rapid and radical effects 
than reforms aiming to change the system from within. 
Spain: Privatization of Hospitals?
The comparison of privatisation in Spain and Swedish is a clear 
illustration of the ambiguity of the concept of privatisation. 
Saltman and Duran explain that a radical privatisation policy 
is inconceivable in the Spanish political context. Therefore, 
a pragmatic approach was the only politically feasible 
option. Privatisation is sought by means of administrative 
concessions to private firms to run a public hospital during 
a contract period in return for a (performance-related) fee. 
The hospital remains in public ownership. The reform is 
driven by the need to reduce public deficits which are closely 
related to the financial crisis that has severely hit Spain since 
2009. This suggests that the Spanish version of privatisation 
had another objective than the reform in Sweden: to save 
costs instead of enhancing consumer choice and fostering 
patient responsiveness. Or: trading negative cash-flows on 
the public balance sheet for commercial returns on publicly 
funded assets. Saltman and Duran do not discuss whether 
the reform has been successful. Instead, they emphasize the 
contested nature of privatisation in Spanish politics, where 
the conservative political forces manifest themselves as an 
advocate of privatisation initiatives whereas the left political 
forces strongly oppose privatisation. The political debate has 
been very ideological so far, also because of the absence of 
any impartial and scientific evaluation. One may wonder, 
however, whether such an evaluation would put an end to the 
ideological debate. The results might still be refuted by either 
the advocates or opponents of privatisation. Nevertheless 
their effect on public goals such as access, efficiency and 
quality of care, a secondary analysis of available studies 
show that public and private hospital providers spend their 
resources in a different way which illustrates deeply political 
disputes. Physicians, managers, and shareholders are higher 
rewarded in private hospitals; nurses and supporting staff are 
better paid in public hospitals; for-profits have higher capital 
and administrative expenses.4 
 
Discussion 
Privatisation in healthcare (and other public sectors) appears 
a complex issue. It is not only an ambiguous concept having 
many different meanings, but also a contested concept almost 
inevitably eliciting an ideological debate between opponents 
and advocates. It is particularly the fear for its adverse impacts 
on both universal access and the employment conditions 
of the workers in public hospitals that helps to explain the 
critical stance towards privatisation. Furthermore, there is a 
widespread fear for loss of public control of the government 
in healthcare. 
The analysis of Saltman and Duran demonstrates another 
aspect of the complexity of privatisation: it can be used as a 
policy instrument for a multitude of policy objectives, ranging 
from increasing patient choice and patient responsiveness to 
improving efficiency, tapping extra capital resources, and 
so on. Whereas privatisation in Sweden seems to be mainly 
demand-driven (choice and responsiveness), privatisation in 
Spain primarily follows a supply-driven approach (efficiency, 
cost savings). Unfortunately, Saltman and Duran do not spend 
much attention to the regulatory arrangements surrounding 
privatisation in both countries. These arrangements are 
obviously critical for its success. 
As Saltman and Duran rightly spell out, privatisation almost 
inevitably seems to provoke an ideological debate on the pros 
and cons of privatisation. Prominent issues in this respect are 
its consequences for healthcare costs (including administrative 
costs, access to healthcare, quality of care, efficiency, patient 
responsiveness, salaries, and work conditions). In our view, 
a very important aspect of privatisation is its impact on the 
public-private mix in healthcare provision. For instance, what 
is the balance between the public and private sector? Is the 
private sector involved in ‘cherry-picking’? Does the success of 
the private sector enforce public providers to perform better? 
Does privatisation take place by take-overs or by the erection 
of new providers penetrating into the public system? These 
questions are essential to understand the eventual impact of 
privatisation on the landscape in healthcare provision. 
A noticeable aspect of privatisation in Sweden en Spain is the 
‘non-role’ of the private not-for-profit option in the reform 
(notice that those who define privatisation in terms of for-
profit providers would consider this model at best halfway-
privatisation). This model has a long history in mainly social 
insurance systems (‘Bismarck systems’) including for instance 
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Belgium and the Netherlands. In the latter country even all 
hospitals are private not-for-profit entities (there is still a legal 
ban on for-profit hospital care).6 In Germany, not-for-profit 
hospitals co-exist with public and for-profit hospitals; the not-
for-profit sector has also consolidated its traditionally strong 
position in hospital care. In the Netherlands, two new non-
profit provider organisations, one in home care and the other 
one in caring for patients with Parkinson, are among the most 
successful organizations in healthcare provision, particularly 
in terms of patient satisfaction, (administrative) costs and 
outcomes. There is no clear answer to the question why 
the not-for-profit model has been left out of consideration. 
Neither do Saltman and Duran address this question in 
depth, even though they present the not-for-profit model as 
an interesting alternative for the public and for-profit model 
in the beginning of their analysis. It may be that the social and 
cultural forces which once resulted in the creation of not-for-
profit provider organisation in the aforementioned countries 
– the wish to self-organise healthcare for its constituent 
community – have largely vanished in modern healthcare, so 
that the not-for-profit option has no future. 
Going beyond Sweden and Spain, it seems hardly unthinkable 
for the next decades that the private for-profit sector will not 
extend its role in healthcare provision. The big challenge for 
governments will be how to design a governance structure 
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